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Let’s start with what asylum is: an international
protection mechanism that individuals seeking
“refuge” from violence can use to obtain official
refugee status in another country. The term we use to
refer to forcibly displaced people in general – refugee –
BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
is different than the legal refugee status granted to an
asylum seeker. In order to obtain refugee status, an
asylum seeker has to show they have been (or fear they
will be) persecuted on the basis of race, religion,
political opinion, nationality, or membership of a
particular social group. They also have to show that
their home country cannot offer them protection and
that due to a well-founded fear of persecution they are
unable or unwilling to return home.
The Refugee Convention (1951 & 1967, see UNHCR)
states that countries are responsible for determining
whether an asylum seeker is a refugee or not. Asylum
seekers, in turn, bear most of this responsibility; they
are the ones who have to prove that they fit the above-
mentioned description. Proving a ‘well-founded fear’
can be a difficult task, especially when the standards
for proof shift constantly to reflect the ideological
agendas of national administrations. Whether liberal
or conservative, domestic policy often moves the
credibility goalpost in an attempt to control the
outcome of the asylum process at the structural level. It
is here that the design of distribution of populations
can be orchestrated. Consider the Act made by the
Sixty-First congress to amend the Immigration Act of
1907, which forbade entrance to a wide range of
“classes of aliens,” including “epileptics,” anyone a
surgeon deemed to have “a mental or physical defect”
impacting labor potential, anyone with any kind of
history of mental illness, unaccompanied minors under
sixteen, contract laborers or anyone who did not pay
their own passage, unless, of course, they were
“persons employed strictly as personal or domestic
servants” (Sixty-First Congress 1910).
Like immigration policy, a lot of work has gone into
crafting definitions of Refugee Law that would
preempt many individuals fleeing violence from being
recognized as legitimate asylum seekers. We call this
structural pre-screening. The 1951 Refugee Convention,
in fact, had a “territorial application clause” where
countries were not required to extend the Convention
to everyone; rather, only to the people they saw fit, so
that they could comfortably avoid refugees from
former colonies while accepting European applicants
(Mayblin 2017). Structural pre-screening allows
governments to avoid letting people enter without
explicitly saying “we do not want these people from
these places” (though it’s debatable whether the US
has this difficulty now). It allows democratic rule of
law to operate right alongside anti-democratic
processes, and by design. 
Over time, administrations have had to get more
sophisticated in their approaches to structural pre-
screening. Whereas Roosevelt could incarcerate
“undesirable aliens” in concentration camps with little
more than a wartime security narrative in 1936, Reagan
and Nixon knew enough about crafting public policy
in a post-civil rights era to conceal their private
sentiments towards people of color in certain venues.
After a lengthy court battle, earlier this year the
National Archives finally released a phone call
between the two ex-presidents where they can be
heard joking and bromancing over mutually-shared
racist antipathies towards Africans, calling them
cannibals, monkeys, and uncivilized people who only
recently learned to wear shoes (Naftali 2019). Neither
one believed they were racist—Reagan especially. Yet
Nixon’s war on drugs and Reagan’s housing policy
were proof of their many commitments to bring
structured harm to communities of color the same way
Jim Crow had functioned after reconstruction. Strategy
can be seen in structural intent, not just private belief
(or self-reflection on one’s belief).
For Reagan, the rise of multicultural politics meant
that he had to employ structural pre-screening
strategies more consistently in his immigration policy.
His public comments on borders and immigration
were often liberal and best explained through his
broader economic liberalization agenda for North
America. He couldn’t afford to piss off Mexico as a
trade partner, nor give up its cheap labor force in the
U.S. In 1986, he granted amnesty to millions of
(predominantly Mexican) undocumented migrants.
When asked to defend his policy, he answered that “no
regulation or law should be allowed if it results in
crops rotting in the fields for lack of harvesters.” He
had a clear answer to: “What can Brown do for you?”
U.S. refugee policy prior to the Refugee Act of 1980
was part of broader foreign policy aims at dismantling
communism. Passed in the last days of the Carter
Administration, the 1980 Act amended 1962 and 1965
legislation that were not in line with international
standards by giving statutory right to asylum seekers.
Anyone now could, in theory, apply based on their
“human right” to asylum. When large numbers of
Haitian and Central American refugees began
applying, the Reagan administration quickly
reclassified them as “economic migrants,” knowing
there is no international standard for the human right
to economic betterment.
Like the dog-whistle politics of Lee Atwater’s southern
strategy, these legally coded nuances made it easy for
folks benefiting from the exclusionary politics of settler
colonial nativism to deny the functional purpose of
asylum policy in U.S. immigration politics, which is to
keep America white. While it’s much harder to justify
and pass white supremacist domestic policy without
structural pre-screening (because courts have to step in
procedurally–see Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S.___2018), it
is not essential once the foundations have been well
laid. Thus, President Trump can openly remark: “Why
do we want these people from all these [Haiti, El
Salvador, African Nations] shithole countries? …We
should have more people from places like Norway”
without historical contradiction in U.S. Asylum policy. 
Recently, Lucy Mayblin’s (2017) work makes clear that
Refugee Law since its inception has been structurally
exclusionary. Mayblin traces the history of structured
exclusions from the very social categories associated
with legitimate asylum seekers that led up to the
formation of the 1951 Convention. The law said one
thing but did another without producing a legal
contradiction. The struggle that governments seem to
be having today teeters on the ups of looking like a
“good” international actor on the multinational human
rights stage—which comes with important benefits
and protections—and the downs of having to
constantly find new policies, methods, and strategies
that prevent certain people from certain places from
using their “human right” to asylum.
These legal ideals of who may rightfully belong in
what lands, for how long, and under what “status”
come from very old cultural traditions of
understanding territorial belonging, displacement, and
power that predate modern international refugee
protection efforts. They have always been closely
connected to settler imaginaries and violences that
support them, like racism, sexism, and ableism. Back in
the fifth century BCE when democracy was just rising,
the term asylum (from the Greek asulon, as in “a place
of refuge”) arose to refer to the physical state of being
protected from a political body’s right of seizure. We
find evidence of this definition in Aeschylus’ story of
the Libyan king’s fifty daughters who fled to Greece to
escape forced marriage to their cousins in Egypt and
sought asylum in the city of Argos (Supplicant Women
607-620). Granted asylum by the people of Argos, the
women ‘supplicants’ rejoiced “that we strangers
should have the right to settle here freely, safe from arrest
or attack from mortals, that no one domestic or foreign
should drive us away”. Asylum meant one couldn’t
just take or violate what was designated as inviolable,
untakable, and that there were new punishments for
doing so. It is rooted in patriarchal assumptions of the
ideal victim, women’s purity, men’s rights, cultural
essentialism and paternalism, but also an important
imaginary of rights to resettlement on foreign lands.  
Since the beginning, asylum has been constructed as a
tool of social power. It was something that had to be
granted through power, not something one had the
power to make happen through an inherent human
right. It had a distinct structure of giver-with-power
and asker-without-power who was under conditions
of duress the giver may have helped shape or uphold.
This context of supplication only intensified under the
Imperial power machine of the Roman empire, which
lasted well into the fifteenth century before
restructuring in European colonial policy. In Justinian’s
Institutes, for instance, the law regulating asylum
pertained to the managing of fugitive slaves and
providing corrective measures that maintained the
Roman practice of enslavement. Doing good for good’s
sake was never on the table.  
So, there is nothing really new about asylum as a tool
of social power. Its conceptual parameters have been
crafted for over two millennia to serve the interests of
particular cultural traditions. The legal principle of
non-refoulement that prevents those with a credible
fear of returning home due to threat of harm can be
found as far back as 431 BC in Euripides’ Medea (727-
728). The reason this history is useful is to show
invariance across social transformations. While
Refugee and Asylum policy falls strictly into the
governance structures of modern nation states and the
related legal infrastructures of multinational
organizations (such as the U.N. and I.C.J.), the
supporting conventions that allow policy to function
violently against some populations but not others are
quite old. It’s not a political story about just and unjust
restrictions against non-citizens or the rational limits
and obligations of powers of state in modern nations.
It’s about who has the power to speak, be heard, and
listen—who has always had it—and who is in the
perpetual position to be the one doing the asking.
On the long view of history, the institution of asylum
provides a master class in gaslighting: it is always
other than what one knows it to be. Today, it is a racial
reorganization of the prison industrial system through
privatized, for-profit detention centers of migrants. On
the surface, it pretends to be about credibility and
facts. It seems to be all about proving, as a matter of
objective fact, whether an asylum seeker has suffered
or fears the said persecution. At every level, from the
first encounters with an Asylum Pre-Screening Officer
(APSO) to immigration judges at a full asylum hearing,
to Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), what’s been
publicly emphasized is how different people have to
believe that your story makes sense and that your
testimony is credible. The U.S. has aptly named the
initial interview in the modern asylum process the
“credible fear test.”
A credible fear test is an in-depth interview
processgiven to undocumented people of any age
arriving at a U.S. port of entry to determine
qualification for asylum-seeking. The test suggests that
all that is determined is the credibility of your fear and
poses as neutral tool for determining which asylum
seekers legitimately deserve to have their full cases
heard by a judge. It was first developed in 1991 by the
Immigration and Naturalization Services (I.N.S.) as
alegal standard“to screen for possible refugees among
the large number of Haitian migrants who were
interdicted at sea during the mass exodus following a
coup d’état in Haiti.” (RAIO and Asylum Division
Officer Training). They were instituted as an actual
interview procedurein 2002 to mitigate risk of
removing asylum seekers under new expedited removal
rules. In other words, because expedited removal
meant you could now be flagged for removal without a
hearing or trial, it was important to try and save those
the US saw as deserving of asylum from slipping
through the net. 
In USCIS’s (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services)
words, credible fear tests are there to determine
whether “there is a significant possibility that he or she
could establish in a full hearing before an immigration
judge that he or she has been persecuted or has a well-
founded fear of persecution or harm” (See USCIS
Credible Fear FAQ, our emphasis). “Significant
possibility” is supposed to be a low threshold to allow
the next step to kick in for legitimate asylum
applicants. The opposite is in fact the case; these tests
are instruments of structural pre-screening, pre-
determining in advance who can and cannot claim
their (human) right to asylum. One way to see this is
through the contradictions in aims brought by
Reasonable Fear screenings. Individuals who are
already subject to administrative removals can only
make defensive claims for asylum (instead of
affirmative cases, where you’re asking to be let in or
allowed to stay but haven’t been subject to removal
orders or proceedings). In defensive claims, the
standard for belief of an applicant’s fear is
“reasonable,” not “credible” fear. The bar for
reasonable fear of persecution or torture is higher than
credible fear, in that you have to show there’s good
reason to think a judge would grant a withholding of
removal orders.
It is not surprising to us that something that is
designed to separate legitimate” asylum seekers from
“illegitimate” ones is a perfect place to serve interests
and projects other than the ones stated.  Following
President Trump’s executive order (EO – January 25,
2017) “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvements,” USCIS updated its lesson plan (Feb
13, 2017 effective on Feb 27, 2017) for asylum officers,
which sets the standards for conducting interviews.
The new lesson plan tried to clarify the threshold of
“significant possibility.” It highlighted that “significant
possibility” standard was higher than the “not
manifestly unfounded” standard favored by the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) (RAIO and Asylum Division
Officer Training). The new plan stated that an
applicant’s testimony has to be not only credible but
also persuasive and has to refer to specific facts, noting
that a credible testimony by itself will not be enough.
The goalpost got moved quickly and much further
back:
[It] encouraged officers to pay attention to all
“relevant evidence” and “make a credibility finding
based on a ‘totality of circumstances.’” “Thus, the
officer can take into account inconsistencies and
discrepancies that are not relevant to the asylum
claim.” In fact, the lesson plan removes language
that requires that credibility findings be relevant to
the claim. … the lesson plan instructs officers to
probe applicants during their interviews as to
inconsistencies between their initial statements
with Immigration and Customs Enforcement or
Customs and Border Protection [CBP] and the
testimony before the asylum office. Such
inconsistencies on their own could result in the
asylum claim being deemed not credible
(https://cliniclegal.org/resources/uscis-revises-
protection-screening-lesson-plans
(https://cliniclegal.org/resources/uscis-revises-
protection-screening-lesson-plans)).
Consider the case of ten-year-old David, his brother
Marco, and their Mother (pseudonymized here for
safety). David and his mother were given a credible
fear interview when reaching the US through Mexico,
while Marco had been earlier apprehended and
returned to El Salvador. David’s mother testified that
both children had been targeted for violence by well-
known criminal organizations and that they were
marked for retribution for refusing recruitment as
children. The mother’s fear was founded, among other
evidence, on the fact that her children had been
physically beaten. The APSO, who took sketchy notes,
only said the ten-year-old gave one-word answers and
did not appropriately respond as they expected
someone to respond when answering questions about
torture. Their test had a negative finding. Shortly after,
word came: Marco had been killed back in El Salvador.
With this evidence, a Request for Reconsideration was
issued. “The Asylum Office summarily denied it
within the hour” (Jain and Lee 2018). 
The discretionary space allowed to asylum officers has
dramatically increased under the Trump
administration, allowing officers to decline claims
based on considerations beyond ‘credibility’. In our
previous work, we have called this phenomenon
“institutional comfort,” referring to how decision-
makers are systemically afforded the ability to
arbitrarily and ambiguously misinterpret asylum
applicants’ experiences, cultures, and countries. The
term called attention to the discretionary space
systemically afforded to state actors within their
institutional roles and how easily this discretionary
space can be used to produce inconsistent, ambiguous,
and arbitrary assessments of applicants’ experiences
(Sertler 2018). Where institutional comfort exists, the
term “evidence” becomes functionalized to serve the
interests of ideology, not objective finding through
logical analysis.  Consider now Lourdes’s story:
In May [2018], Lourdes walked across the bridge from
Mexico to El Paso, Texas, and requested asylum. The
first step is an interview with an asylum officer.
“I told him that I have the evidence on me,” Lourdes
said, through an interpreter. She told the asylum officer
about the scar on her arm, and the four missing fingers
on her left hand—all evidence, she says, of a brutal
attack by a gang in her native Honduras.
But the asylum officer rejected her claim.
“I don’t know what happened,” Lourdes said. “I don’t
know how I failed.”
(https://www.npr.org/2018/07/20/630877498/denie
d-asylum-but-terrified-to-return-home
(https://www.npr.org/2018/07/20/630877498/denie
d-asylum-but-terrified-to-return-home))
The question of evidence, then, does not mean much
without the question of what counts as evidence in an
administrative system built to structurally pre-screen
individuals on the basis of white supremacist logics.
Lourdes’s case also takes us to Sessions’s 2018 decision
in Matter of A-B-. In it, Sessions overrules a prior BIA
case, Matter of A-R-C-G-, which qualified domestic
violence survivors for asylum based on their particular
social group, e.g. “married women in Guatemala who
are unable to leave their relationship.” Sessions
attempted to change the parameters of the
membership in a particular social group category,
which is the asylum ground mostly used in gender-
based violence cases. The structural intent is clear:
prevent domestic violence survivors and other
survivors of persecution by non-state actors from being
eligible for asylum.[1] Sessions tried to exclude the
persecution perpetrated by non-government agents
from the kinds of persecution the U.S. is responsible to
offer international protection from as a signatory to the
Refugee Convention: “Generally, claims by aliens
pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence
perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not
qualify for asylum” (Matter of A-B-, Respondent 2018).
USCIS followed suit with a policy memorandum
(USCIS PM 602-0162 2018). The territorial application
clause never really left. It just reorganized structurally. 
Sessions goes on to state: “The mere fact that a country
may have problems effectively policing certain crimes
or that certain populations are more likely to be
victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum
claim” (Matter of A-B-, Respondent 2018). Seeing
cultures as persecutors or as “naturally” inclined to
produce crime allows the receiving states and cultures
to substantiate their moral and political superiority
(Bhabha 2002, Noll 2006), and to exonerate themselves,
and thus it serves the settler colonial logic persistently.
It was not a coincidence that although Sessions’s
decision did not specify a country, it affected asylum
applicants from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras
disproportionately (Human Rights First 2019). This is
something Mayblin also calls attention to in her effort
to trace colonial legacies of asylum seeking: the
seemingly neutral policy language that specifically
targets some people from certain places.
We also have to consider Sessions’s decision in the
bigger context of U.S.’s on-going approach to gender-
based violence in Refugee Law (e.g. Nayak 2015,
McKinnon 2016, Millbank & Dauvergne 2010). The
U.S.’s approach to “social group” asylum ground,
commonly used by gender-based applicants, has been
criticized for being far too limiting. Jenni Millbank and
Catherine Dauvergne have said: “…on the issue of
particular social groups the United States was and
remains the most stagnant, least coherent and most out
of step with international developments” (2010, 938).
In this context, then, leaning on evidence, consistency,
and credibility in testimony as indicators of qualified
asylum seeking is an old epistemological game, where
some people cannot win. To emphasize “consistency”
when people are talking about traumatic events in a
new setting, in front of a uniformed enforcement
officer, in a language very likely not their own, in front
of people who, they know, might not consider gender-
based violence as legitimate persecution is nothing but
violent (Baillot et al. 2014, Kelson 1997, Neacsu 2003).
Terms like “significant possibility,” “evidence,”
“consistency,” “credibility,” can never be neutral in the
context of colonial administrative violence. These
issues are what we hope to highlight in a book we are
currently working on with Nora Berenstain, entitled
Knowledge Refugees: Gender-Based Asylum and Epistemic
Violence in the U.S.-México Border.
We know legal criticism of many of these claims comes
in the form of ameliorative relief provided in specific
cases, as well as legal challenges to anti-immigrant
policy items. It is good to know the Ninth circuit court
of appeals is on deck most days (until Trump’s twelve
GOP appointees are confirmed and radically reshape
the balance of the court), recently ruling that negative
findings of credible fear tests can be appealed. But
appellate reconsideration mechanisms do not change
the structure of informancy built into the process, how
easy it is to use credible fear interviews to pre-screen
who can be considered for asylum—think  about the
recent attempt to give the right to administer credible
fear test to CBP officers as opposed to trained asylum
officers (Veroff 2019)—or the months and years that the
process can take. It does not address the new and often
irreparable harms brought on by U.S. policy in the
form of forced family separations, sexual violence by
patrol officers and gross neglect resulting in death. In
“Lynch Law in America” (1900) Ida B. Wells reminds
us that “while the United States cannot protect, she can
pay. This she has done, and it is certain will have to do
again in the case of the recent lynching of Italians in
Louisiana. The United States already has paid in
indemnities for lynching nearly a half million dollars.”
Compounding for interest, it is smart policy to start
thinking of the cost of not reuniting children with their
parents and abolishing the for-profit carceral detention
of migrants. Given America’s history of structured
misdeeds, the list is only getting longer. 
We think that credible fear tests are structured to be
instruments of violence that turn on a colonial logic of
power, not objective measurement tools that help
determine the validity of applicants’ claims in the
absence of clear and present indicators of harm. By
“colonial logic” we are referring to a way of
understanding the world—an epistemological system
—that “upholds” and “preserves” a hierarchy of social
organization that justifies the ongoing, non-accidental,
and systemic dispossession of Indigenous people’s lands
and resources and legitimizes structured harm to some
people but not to others (Dotson 2014, Mayblin 2017,
Ruíz (forthcoming)). This logic is functionalized
through institutionalized practices. And it surfaces in
many ways: when asylum seekers’ experiences,
cultures, and countries are only intelligible through the
dominant cultural norms of settler colonial culture
(Ruíz 2010).
There is no doubt structural pre-screening will
continue because settler colonial heteropatriarchal
white supremacist structures continue. Who do we
think CBP will tend to consider a legitimate asylum
seeker? Where will they be from? What will they look
like? The ebbs and flows may bring different statistical
data but on the broader timeline, a pattern emerges.
Credible fear tests are structurally violent. They are
used to obtain positive results as well, sure, but that’s
not the point. They are built to be used as instruments
of violence when wanted and/or needed, and this little
ready-to-hand tool is replicated across a multitude of
institutions and structures that impact our lives. The
capacity to use them as instruments of violence is built
into them, ready to use when any administration
wants to stop certain people from certain places from
entering without regard to their own occupation of
Indigenous lands. One tool is both sword and shield,
protective and harm. As a double-edged instrument,
asylum policy in the U.S. is and is not about human
rights.  It is about who has been deciding who is
human enough to use that right. We think this is
functionally indifferent from other practices in its
history.
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*This post builds upon “Structural Violence and the
Settler Logic of Credible Fear Tests,” the presentation
that Elena Ruíz and Ezgi Sertler gave in a session at the
2019 Pacific APA entitled Decolonization and Settler
Colonial Theory.
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University. 
[Description of photo below: a photo of Ezgi (and her
curls) near a beach in Los Angeles. A smiling Ezgi,
who is wearing a dark shirt and sunglasses and carries
a backpack, stands next to some plants and flowers, as
well as a palm tree. There are a few volleyball nets and
people on the beach.]
 Ezgi Sertler is an assistant professor of philosophy at
Butler University.
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